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THE UNPROTECTED CONSUMER-MAKER UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
BY DONALD B. KING*
Assisted by William H. Soisson III
The Uniform Commercial Code was drafted for the purpose of modern-
izing and making more realistic the law of commercial transactions. Using
prior case law and statutes as a frame of reference, the drafters of the Code
have made notable changes in commercial law.
Some of the opponents of the Code had indicated that the transition
from prior law would be difficult and would engender confusion. This,
however, does not appear to be true. For example, the transition in Penn-
sylvania has been relatively smooth in the field of negotiable instruments.
The courts have simply looked to the date of the instrument in order to
ascertain which law should be applied. If the instrument was signed
prior to the effective date of the Code, prior law was applied.' While
conceivably some questions could arise as to whether a particular right
"flows" from the transaction under the transitional provision of the Code,2
none have confronted the courts. It was also contended that the new
terminology would cause extended litigation. This predicted wave of
litigation, however, never came. In approximately seven and one half years
in a highly commercialized state with a population of over eleven and one
half million, there are only seventeen published opinions dealing primarily
with commercial paper in which the courts have based their decisions upon
Code provisions.3 In the few cases which did reach the courts, the new
terminology did not appear to cause undue confusion.
Despite its forward outlook, some of the results under the Code in the
area of commercial paper have not been entirely satisfactory. One weak-
ness in particular is that the consumer-maker lacks sufficient protection
in dealings involving negotiable paper. The purpose of this article is to
analyze this lack of protection through an examination of the Code and
cases decided under its provisions, and to suggest possible amendments
which would alleviate the problem.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law; B.S., Washington State
University; LL.B., Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., Roller v. Jaffee, 387 Pa. 501, 128 A.2d 355 (1957). See also, DELDUCA
AND KING, COMMERCIAL CODE LITIGATION xvi (1960) (Mimeographed book at Dickinson
School of Law) for a complete list of cases decided since the enactment of the Code
but governed by the provisions of the Negotiable Instrument Law.
2. It might be contended that while a note was made prior to the Code, the rights
stemming from an endorsement or from an act after the Code had taken effect must be
enforced under applicable law at the time of such endorsement or act.
3. Of this number, approximately three-fourths of these decisions were on the trial
court level. See DELDUCA AND KING, COMMERCIAL CODE LITIGATION, supra note 1.
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CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
The Code permits notes to contain "confession of judgment" clauses
unless such clauses are invalid under state law.4 While there are laws
invalidating such clauses in most states, they are valid in Pennsylvania. 5
In most of the cases thus far, judgment has been entered on the notes
involving such clauses.6 This places the consumer-maker at a considerable
disadvantage. Ordinarily he must either pay the judgment or incur the
expenses of an attorney in order to institute an action to open the judgment.
If he chooses the latter course of action, the maker has the burden of con-
vincing the court that he has a sufficient defense. Generally, the decision of
the court on this matter will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse
of discretion. The consumer-maker in these instances is "liable until proven
not liable." If the maker is found to have a defense, and judgment is opened,
the procedure is still an expensive luxury.
Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain the number of instances where the
consumer-maker has paid the judgment rather than going through the time,
expense and worry of litigation which is necessary to open it. He often is
unable to finance litigation, and is generally unaware of his legal rights.
Add a judgment-a symbol of judicial backing-to the threats of foreclosure
on a man's car or house (which even if not legally feasible are a considerable
worry to the maker) and the factors which make the contest uneven become
more apparent. Also, where judgment is confessed and entered, the con-
sumer-maker may not only be faced with a judgment for the amount of his
purchase, but for considerable attorney fees and costs as well. Thus for
example, on a debt of 390 dollars, seventy dollars in attorney's fees may be
added into the judgment.7 Not only is the consumer burdened with a defec-
tive piece of merchandise, but also with a judgment in excess of the obliga-
tion he may have thought he was incurring.
Thus the Code section permitting judgment clauses ignores the realities
of the burden placed upon the consumer who signed the note.8 The argu-
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-112(d) and Comment two.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-112(d) (1953).
6. See DELDUCA AND KING, supra note 1 at 113-157.
7. Transcript of Record, p. 17a, Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. Mullaney, 187
Pa. Super. 190, 144 A.2d 438 (1958).
8. The only shaft of light in this dark area occurs when a time note contains a
term that the judgment may be confessed at "any time." This term destroys the nego-
tiable character of the note, and the maker's original defenses against the payee are good
against institutions which have purchased the note. However, it is improbable that
most notes will contain this latter term, since it has this effect. Sufficient advantage
is obtained by commercial interests with the simple confession of judgment clause, which
enables them to enter judgment after defalt of payment. The effect of the above-
mentioned clause could be availed of by the use of a demand payment term. Atlas Credit
Corp. v. Leonard, 56 Lanc. Rev. 57, 57 Pa. D.&C. 2d 292 (1957) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v.
Gardiner, 191 Pa. Super. 17, 155 A.2d 405 (1959).
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ment that such clauses are necessary for the flow of commercial paper would
seem to fail when it is realized that this "flow" is continuing unabated in the
vast number of states in which they are invalid. The permitting of such
clauses also does not promote the purpose of uniformity which underlies the
Code.
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
Due to the apparent inadequate protection which the Code provides for
the consumer, the majority of the cases that have arisen under it involve
questions in this area. The 1952 draft of the Code provided, among other
things, that the holder, in order to be a holder in due course, must have taken
the instrument "in good faith, including observance of the reasonable com-
mercial standards of any business in which the holder may be engaged."
Good faith was further defined as "honesty in fact." 10 Thus both a subjective
and objective standard were provided." This meant that banks and finance
companies could not blindly shut their eyes to facts which indicated that
there was fraud involved in the original transaction and still obtain the
benefits of a "holder in due course." It also gave the consumer an oppor-
tunity of using objective facts to show that the holder should not be given
this status. This alleviated the difficult task of attempting to show the
holder's state of mind. The maker could obtain these facts by use of modern
procedural developments such as the taking of depositions and requiring the
production of documents. The use of such methods of discovery was sus-
tained in a recent case.12 Even so, the difficulty of showing that there had
been a deviation from "reasonable commercial standards"'" made this measure
9. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302(1) (b).
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(19).
11. Historically, there has been a fluctuation between requiring and not requiring
holders to satisfy objective standards in due course. In the earliest cases in this area,
the courts were not confronted with the problem of whether the holders had departed
from the reasonable standards of their trade. However, the courts did use such language
as "bona fide ... in the course of currency, and in the way of his business." Miller v.
Race, 1 Burr. 461, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758). This indicates that the courts might
have held that a departure from such standards prevented one from being a holder in
due course, if they had been presented with such an issue. The cases which were later
decided, however, definitely followed the subjective standard. Lawson v. Weston, 4 Esp.
56, 170 Eng. Rep. 640 (K.B. 1801). Nevertheless in 1824, the court in Gill v. Cubitt,
3 B.&C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (K.B. 1824) held that the holder was not a holder in
due course if he took the note under circumstances which might have excited the
suspicions of a prudent and careful man. Later the courts gradually returned to the
subjective standard of determining good faith. See Crook v. Jodis, 5 B & Ad. 909,
110 Eng. Rep. 1028 (K.B. 1834); Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870, 111 Eng. Rep.
1011 (K.B. 1836); BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 100 (1943). However, it has been
asserted by some authorities that the courts have implicitly required a conformance with
reasonable commercial standards in order for there to be good faith. See UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302, Comment 1 (1952). The Code brought back the objective test
in conjunction with the subjective test of honesty in fact.
12. Backman & Co. Inc. v. Brubaker, 56 Lanc. Rev. 289 (1958).
13. See note 9, supra.
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of dubious value. In most situations thus far, the consumers have apparently
been unable to effectively utilize this requirement to their advantage.
One reason why this provision did not alleviate completely the problem
of the unprotected consumer is that it failed to cope with a basic part of the
underlying problem. The technical analysis of this type of case as being
primarily a question as to which of two "innocents," the maker or holder,
should suffer is not realistic in many cases. The consumer often signs papers
in connection with the purchase of goods without reading them. The print
is often rather fine and difficult to read, and various technical business and
legal terminology is often scattered throughout the paper. The forms are
standard printed ones and there is generally not the element of bargaining
as to what shall be the terms or type of arrangement. The average man
often feels that he has neither the time nor understanding to read all of this
printed matter. Indeed, there are even "rare" situations where persons such
as law students, professors, and lawyers have been known not to read the
fine print of papers signed by them. The consumer usually receives no
assistance from the seller who is too "busy" with other matters to explain
and interpret these forms. Moreover, the salesman, who is generally skilled
in the art of persuasion, usually finds little difficulty in convincing the buyer
that it is unnecessary to read the papers.14 Thus, it is unrealistic to say that
the consumer is "negligent" in not reading the form and should be the one
to suffer the loss.
The institutional holder, on the other hand, is in the business of discount-
ing paper. It has the resources and facilities to ascertain the reliability of
those from whom it purchases the paper. It can restrict its purchases to
payees or holders who are reliable. Also, in many cases the institution is
able to telephone, telegraph or write the maker to inform him where to make
his payments after it has purchased the note, and it would not be too burden-
some in some of these cases for it to contact the maker before it purchased
the note."5 Moreover, the institution handles a number of transactions and
is able to spread its losses, whereas the individual consumer cannot.
Objections to the "reasonable commercial standards clause," however,
were raised by strong financial interests which contended that it would
substantially impair the flow of commercial paper.' 6 It was argued that it
would bring back the doctrine of Gill v. Cubitt,17 which allegedly caused the
discrediting of Bank of England notes on the continent in 1824. Several
14. Transcript of Record, p. 29a, First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co. v.
DeLise, 186 Pa. Super. 398, 142 A.2d 401 (1958) ; Transcript of Record, p. 14a, Budget
Charge Accounts v. Mullaney, 187 Pa. Super. 190, 144 A.2d 438 (1958).
15. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, p. 33a, First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust
Co. v. DeLise, supra note 14.
16. 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION 204 (1954).
17. 3 B. & C. 466, 107 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1824).
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things should be noted in regard to this point. First, there is little reliable
evidence as to what effect this case actually had on the flow of commercial
paper at the time. Secondly, the nature of the instrument and the particular
economic setting of over one hundred years ago make this an invalid
criterion of the present day effects of an objective standard. Indeed, a far
better test would be the experience of Pennsylvania with this clause over the
past seven years. Here, this standard did not result either in judicial con-
fusion or in the impair of the flow of commercial paper.
Another criticism of this provision was that it would create the complex
problem of deciding reasonable standards of diverse businesses.' 8 This
alleged problem, however, has not arisen thus far, and there is nothing to
indicate that it will arise in the future. Although the courts generally have
not been confronted with deciding cases upon this language, the determina-
tion of whether there has been a deviation from such standards should not be
difficult if general commercial classifications are followed. It should also be
noted that other sections of the Code currently contain requirements of
"reasonable commercial standards" and the courts will be presented with the
same type of problem when applying these sections.19
Nevertheless, even though these objections to the "reasonable commercial
standards" clause did not prove to be valid when subjected to actual trial, the
vested commercial interests handily won the battle. The objective standard
of the good faith test was eliminated in the 1957 draft of the Code and in the
1959 Pennsylvania amendments. 20 The reason given by the drafters for this
change was that it was "intended to make clear that the doctrine of an
objective standard of good faith, exemplified by the case of Gill v. Cubitt, 3
B & C 466 (1824) is not intended to be incorporated in Article 3.' '21 As
the Code now stands, institutions still might be considered as holders in
due course even though they do not follow reasonable commercial standards.
DEFENSES OF THE CONSUMER
The Code provides the maker of a note with a defense against the holder
in due course where he has been induced by a misrepresentation to sign the
instrument "with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain
knowledge of its character or its essential terms. '22 Several things should be
18. Britton, Holder in Due Course-A Comparison of the Provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law with Those of Article 3 of the Proposed Commercial Code,
49 Nw. L. REv. 430 (1954).
19. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 2-103(1) (6) and 3-406 (1959).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-302(1) (b) (1959).
21. See 1956 Recommendations for the Uniform Commercial Code issued by the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissions of Uniform State
Laws § 3-302.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 3-305(2) (c) (1959).
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noted about this provision. One is that it retains the traditional distinction
between fraud in the inception and fraud in the inducement.23 While it does
furnish the consumer with a defense in situations where the misrepresenta-
tion prevents him from ascertaining the character of the instrument, it does
not protect the consumer in cases where the fraud of the payee has been
related to the product, performance, or other aspects of the transaction. Yet
fraud in this latter area may be even more difficult to discover. Thus this
historical distinction fails to take into account difficulties of equal magnitude
for the consumer in the area of fraud in the inducement.
Not only are the defenses of the consumer limited to fraud in the incep-
tion, but even where such fraud on the part of the payee can be shown, the
consumer-maker nmst show that he had been induced to sign the instrument
with "neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of
its character or its essential terms. '24 While the comment to the section lists
a number of factors which should be taken into account in deciding this issue,
the section is so worded that it is difficult for the court to hold in favor of
the consumer. Thus in one case the court found a reasonable opportunity to
obtain knowledge of the documents and terms even though it appears that
one of the consumers had little formal education, another could not read the
fine print, and their friend who was present did not read the documents
because of the fast and continuous talking of the salesman.2 5 While the
courts should utilize the factors mentioned in the comments to protect the
consumer when possible, this court, as others, undoubtedly felt strongly
constrained by the statutory language. The court, in ruling against the con-
sumer, noted that there was no evidence that the salesmen would have
refused to let the consumer examine the papers if he had asked.26 This,
however, ignores the fact that the consumer often does not ask because of the
prevalent "pressure methods" used by the "skilled" salesman. Two other
factors in these situations which often prevent the consumer from ascertain-
ing the nature of the paper or its terms are: (1) the physical characteristics
and arrangements of the papers 2 T and (2) the overall complexity of the
scheme. 28 The unworkable nature of the section is more apparent when it is
23. Also referred to as "real" or "essential" fraud, and "fraud in the essence," or
"fraud in factum."
24. See note 22, supra.
25. First National Bank of Philadelphia v. Anderson, 5 Bucks 287, 7 Pa. D.&C.2d
661 (1956).
26. Ibid.
27. Often the consumer does not realize he is signing a judgment note since it is a
part of the same sheet of paper as is the contract. First National Bank of Philadelphia
v. Anderson, 5 Bucks 287, 7 Pa. D.&C.2d 661 (1956).
28. Transcript of Record, pp. 27a-34a, First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co.
v. DeLise, supra note 14; Transcript of Record, pp. 18a-22a, Budget Charge Accounts
v. Mullaney, supra note 14.
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noted that the maker not only has the burden of establishing evidence show-
ing the payee's fraud, but also of showing that he had no reasonable oppor-
tunity to ascertain the nature or terms of the instrument.
29
ALTERATIONS
In a situation where a note contains blank spaces which are not filled in
by the consumer when he signs, but are later unscrupulously filled in, the
holder in due course may enforce the instrument as completed.3 0 Also in
situations where the note is altered and the maker's negligence contributes
to the alteration, the bank or finance company may enforce it as changed.
1 l
The main theory behind this provision is that the maker of the note is negli-
gent in "setting it afloat upon a sea of strangers" and must bear the conse-
quences.32 The concept of negligence in consumer transactions is not entirely
realistic in its application. It is relatively easy for the seller to convince the
consumer that the blanks will be filled in when the exact interest is figured
or other minor costs are ascertained. In addition, the seller may merely tell
him that some of the blank spaces in the standard printed form do not
pertain to this type of transaction. The consumer, who has already filled in
numerous blanks and the price to be paid on the main agreement, does not
realize that it is also necessary to fill in other spaces. Thus, while business-
men might be held to a standard of filling all blanks and spaces, it is un-




Amendments to Article Three are necessary if the consumer is to be
protected and the policies of the Code implemented. Modern financing prac-
tices make this an area of utmost importance, and the effect of other provi-
sions of the Code benefiting the consumer may be rendered nugatory by the
sections of Article Three which deprive him of his defenses.
In drafting such amendments it must be recognized that different rules
are necessary for the consumer and the businessman acting for his company.
As mentioned previously, it is unrealistic to operate on the assumption that
the consumer will fully read or understand the paper presented to him in a
personal transaction. Nor is it reasonable to expect him to consult a lawyer
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-307 and Comments (1954).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-407(3) (1959) ; see also First National Bank of
Philadelphia v. Anderson, vtpra note 25; Century Appliance Co. v. Groff, 56 LAW. REV.
67 (1958).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 3-406 (1959).
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 3-406 and 3-407 and Comments (1954).
33. The weaknesses outlined above regarding Article Three should not restrain
states from adopting the Code, since these weaknesses exist under the NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW and are not aggravated by the Code.
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whenever entering into such purchases. Likewise, it may be difficult for
him to ascertain when signing the note whether there has been any fraud
relating to, or defects in, the product or subsequent performance. He is
generally unskilled in business matters and no semblance of equality exists
between him and the seller.
An amendment giving fuller protection to the consumer could be made
to the section relating to defenses against holders in due course. It could be
provided that the holder in due course does not take the instrument free from
the defenses of a person who has executed the note in connection with the
purchase of "consumer goods. '34 This type of clause could easily be worded
to fit into the listed exceptions to the rights of a holder in due course under
Subsection two of Section 3-305. This would furnish protection for the con-
sumer and at the same time still retain the general concept of holder in due
course for transactions between businessmen. While in a few given instances
there might be questions as to whether "consumer goods" were involved,
generally this should not be a problem. It should be noted that the courts will
be faced with the same issues in interpreting other sections of the Code in
which the term "consumer goods" is used. 35 Nor should this distinction
cause any great problems for banks and financing companies purchasing
notes. Generally they will be able to tell by the name and manner in which
the note is signed, the amount, and the name of the payee of the note, whether
the maker is a consumer and consumer goods are involved. In addition, such
problems usually will not arise for the purchaser of a note who is dealing
only with reliable companies.
Slight amendments to several other sections should also be made to
complete the protection given to the consumer. Section 3-112 should be
changed so that confession of judgment terms will not be valid in cases where
the maker is purchasing consumer goods for his personal consumption. Like-
wise, the consumer should be exempt from the provisions of Section 3-406
concerning alterations and Section 3-407 which permits the holder in due
course to enforce an incompleted instrument as completed.
Since these concepts are of such an important and fundamental nature,
they should be included within the Code, rather than being left up to indi-
vidual states to enact as separate legislation. While in various states separate
acts have been passed which protect the consumer in isolated areas such as the
purchase of a motor vehicle,36 these do not give the overall protection which
34. The definition of "consumer goods" is found in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A,
§ 9-109 (1959).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 9-204, 9-206, 9-302, and 9-307 (1959).
36. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615 (1947) ; see also Maleson, Commercial
Law, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTs LAW Ch. 6 (1959), for a discussion of other
separate legislation designed to protect the consumer.
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is needed.3 1 More important, however, is the fact that separate legislation
within each state on such basic and fundamental concepts would create a lack
of uniformity and defeat one of the major purposes of the Code.
While these amendments to the Code would certainly not solve all of
the problems of the consumer today, they would aid him in a major problem
area. They would also bring about a higher commercial standard by banks
and finance companies. The invalidity of the somewhat nebulous argument
that the "flow of commercial paper will be impaired" is demonstrated by a
continuing of financing in the few areas where the consumer is given protec-
tion by special legislation and in the areas of financing accounts receivable.3
8
Nor would these amendments affect the vast area of financial arrangements
and the use of negotiable instruments as between businessmen. With these
changes, the Code may better reflect realism and bring about a new era in
commercial law-that of "the protected consumer."
37. It has been contended that the Code repeals by virtue of the general repealing
provision all inconsistent acts, among which, seem to be the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance
Act: First National Bank of Millville v. Horwatt, 192 Pa. Super. 581, 162 A.2d 60
(1960).
38. Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience, and Negotiable Paper, 1952 Wisc.
L. REv. 230.
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